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Abstract—A privacy-preserving framework in which a com-
putational resource provider receives encrypted data from a
client and returns prediction results without decrypting the data,
i.e., oblivious neural network or encrypted prediction, has been
studied in machine learning that provides prediction services.
In this work, we present MOBIUS (Model-Oblivious BInary
neUral networkS), a new system that combines Binarized Neural
Networks (BNNs) and secure computation based on secret sharing
as tools for scalable and fast privacy-preserving machine learning.
BNNs improve computational performance by binarizing values
in training to −1 and +1, while secure computation based on
secret sharing provides fast and various computations under
encrypted forms via modulo operations with a short bit length.
However, combining these tools is not trivial because their
operations have different algebraic structures and the use of
BNNs downgrades prediction accuracy in general. MOBIUS
uses improved procedures of BNNs and secure computation
that have compatible algebraic structures without downgrading
prediction accuracy. We created an implementation of MOBIUS
in C++ using the ABY library (NDSS 2015). We then conducted
experiments using the MNIST dataset, and the results show that
MOBIUS can return a prediction within 0.76 seconds, which is six
times faster than SecureML (IEEE S&P 2017). MOBIUS allows
a client to request for encrypted prediction and allows a trainer
to obliviously publish an encrypted model to a cloud provided
by a computational resource provider, i.e., without revealing the
original model itself to the provider.
Index Terms—Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning, Secure
Computation, Neural Network Predictions, Model Obliviousness
I. INTRODUCTION
1) Background: Machine learning methods are widely used
in various situations, such as healthcare, manufacturing, and
financial services. Consequently, privacy has become a serious
concern in the use of big data. In general, the following two
features are important for practical use of machine learning:
(1) make a prediction oblivious without downgrading perfor-
mance; and (2) guarantee the security of a trained model.
In the first feature, the application of a privacy-preserving
mechanism to a prediction is necessary for guaranteeing the
privacy of a client. However, a privacy-preserving mechanism
may downgrade the throughput of a model and may thus not
be used because of poor performance. To solve this dilemma,
a privacy-preserving scheme that does not downgrade
performance of a model is necessary.
In the second feature, different privacy-preserving frame-
works have been proposed but a framework that hides a
model itself, i.e., making the model oblivious, has not been
proposed. According to the Recht hypothesis [1], deep neural
networks work well because they memorize most of their train-
ing data. Several machine learning systems provide prediction
as a service in the cloud, and the aforementioned problem
strongly affects the trustworthiness of a resource provider
who manages a cloud. For example, a resource provider can
extract information or even leak a model that he/she receives
and manages. Therefore, a trainer who owns a dataset and
trains a model has to completely trust a resource provider
who provides a prediction service. Consequently, a trainer who
wants to maintain privacy will hesitate to outsource machine
learning services unless he/she completely trusts a resource
provider. To solve this problem, a model should be encrypted
to prevent unauthorized entities, including a resource provider,
from accessing the model itself.
2) Motivating Example: The main goal of this work is to
create a system that provides encrypted prediction as well
as encryption of a model in such a way that other entities,
including a service provider, cannot access the model itself.
We call this the model-oblivious problem.
In the model-oblivious problem, there are three entities,
namely, a trainer, a resource provider, and a client. A trainer
trains a model with plaintexts, encrypts the model, and then
uploads the encrypted model to a cloud provided by a resource
provider. When the client utilizes a model, he/she accesses the
cloud. By encrypting the model, neither the resource provider
nor a client can extract information from the model. Similarly,
a client can encrypt input data that will be given to the resource
provider.
Figure 1 shows an example scenario describing the intuition
behind the model-oblivious problem. Consider a scenario that
includes a hospital, a cloud server, and doctors as the trainer,
the resource provider, and clients, respectively. The hospital
trains a model with datasets it collected, encrypts the model,
and then publishes the encrypted model on a cloud server,
such as AmazonEC2, to make it publicly available to doctors.
The cloud server can then execute a prediction for an input
provided by a doctor by using the encrypted model without
decryption. With the encrypted model, situations where the
cloud server tries to extract information from the model
or use the model for other purposes can be prevented. In
addition, as an equally important measure, the amount of
Fig. 1. Example Scenario of Model-Oblivious Problem
computation required between a client and a resource provider
is minimized.
We note that oblivious prediction [2]–[9] and encrypted
training [10]–[14] have not discussed or implied the features
of the model-oblivious problem. To the best of our knowledge,
only SecureML [15] is the only other system that considers
the model-oblivious problem, and our goal is to construct a
faster system without sacrificing prediction accuracy.
3) Cryptographic Approach: In this work, we focus on
the use of cryptography for guaranteeing the security of a
trained model. One of the possible solutions to training while
preserving privacy is differential privacy [16], which can
prevent a trained model from leaking an individual record
by perturbing the records with randomized noise. Given this
capability, many works on neural networks use differential
privacy [11], [17]. There are also works on further applications
of differential privacy, e.g., data collection on an untrusted
server [18], [19] or general function release [20]. However, ac-
cording to Dowlin et al. [10], the notion of differential privacy
is not useful in the prediction phase. Moreover, preventing
unauthorized entities from accessing a model is outside the
scope of differential privacy. On the other hand, cryptography
can rigorously control authorized access to only users with
the correct secret information. We therefore construct a system
that uses cryptography to encrypt a trained model and prevent
unauthorized entities from accessing the trained model.
4) Contribution: In this work, we propose a new system
named Model-Oblivious BInarized neUral networkS (MO-
BIUS), which enables scalable encrypted prediction and en-
cryption of a trained model. MOBIUS uses binarized neu-
ral networks (BNNs) [21] and secure computation based on
secret sharing as its main tools. BNNs are neural networks
whose values for weight matrices and activation functions are
binarized to +1 or −1. By avoiding the use of real numbers,
the computational time of operations with binarized values
can be improved. Secure computation based on secret sharing
distributes input data from a client as shares such that an
individual share leaks nothing about the original data, and
it can evaluate the data without reconstructing the data via
the homomorphism of the shares. A bit length of shares can
be shortened in comparison with conventional cryptography,
and thus the resulting secure computation can perform better
than other cryptographic tools, such as fully homomorphic
encryption (FHE) [22].
We note that our contribution is non-trivial. We improved
the algorithms used in BNNs to make them compatible with
the algebraic structures of secure computation. The bit-shift
method used in the original BNNs [21] downgrades prediction
accuracy. Batch normalization [23] is used for improving the
accuracy but it is based on real numbers and is incompat-
ible with secure computation, which is based on integers.
These problems can also potentially downgrade computational
performance (See Section VI-A for details). To overcome
these limitations, we first improve the algorithm of BNNs,
particularly the process of batch normalization, to make use of
integers and make them compatible with secure computation.
Both the accuracy and the computational time can be thus
improved.
We present the construction of MOBIUS utilizing secure
computation based on secret sharing and the improved BNNs
and its implementation in C++ using the ABY library [24].
We conducted experiments using the MNIST dataset, and the
results show that MOBIUS can perform a prediction within
0.76 seconds, which is six times faster than SecureML [15]
even without optimizing our implementation (See Section
VI-C for details).
5) Related Works: The closest work is SecureML [15].
The main motivation of SecureML was to provide scalable
encrypted training, i.e., solving the model-oblivious problem
is not their main goal. Moreover, encrypted training is the out
scope of this work. As related works on combining BNNs
with cryptography, TAPAS [14] and FHE-DiNN [12] based
on FHE have been concurrently proposed. FHE-DiNN utilized
discretized neural networks where domains are defined from
−w to +w, but its experiments were conducted with −1 to
+1 exactly the same as BNNs. These works aim to provide
fast computation of FHE [22], [25] in BNNs, and they did not
discuss the model-oblivious problem.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we provide backgrounds on neural networks
and secure computation to help in understanding our work.
A. Binarized Neural Network
Binarized neural networks (BNNs) [21] were proposed to
reduce overloads by minimizing data sizes. To do this, values
presented in neural networks are binarized to +1 or -1 in order
to reduce the required computational resources.
The original work on BNNs [21] described methods to
binarize three protocols, namely, full connection, batch nor-
malization, and activation, which are required in standard neu-
ral networks. Full connection computes matrix multiplications
between vectors and weight matrices. Batch normalization
makes the distribution for nodes uniform in the training phase
and contributes to speeding up both training and prediction.
Activation applies non-linear processing to output vectors, and
a sign function is utilized in BNNs. Among the protocols
described above, batch normalization has adopted a bit-shift
method to be computed in a binarized form, which is different
from well-known batch normalization algorithms [23], because
the operations in well-known batch normalization algorithms
require real numbers, consequently creating a bottleneck in the
computations.
B. Cryptographic Preliminaries
In this section, we describe the notations and terminologies
used in secure computation based on secret sharing.
1) Secret Sharing.: A t-out-of-n secret sharing scheme over
a finite domain D consists of the following two algorithms:
• (JxK1, . . . , JxKn) ← Share(x): Share takes x ∈ D as
input, and outputs JxK1, . . . , JxKn ∈ D.
• x ← Reconst(JxK1, . . . , JxKt): Reconst takes
JxK1, . . . , JxKt ∈ D as input, and outputs x ∈ D.
In these algorithms, for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, JxKi is called the
i-th share of x. We denote JxK = (JxK1, . . . , JxKn) as their
shorthand. Any less than t shares of x over the t-out-of-n se-
cret sharing scheme jointly give no information on x, whereas
any ≥ t shares jointly determine x by using Reconst. Several
secret sharing schemes that have been proposed typically have
finite domains, e.g., a residue class ring ZM modulo integer
M > 1 and an ℓ-length binary string [26]. An i-th share of
an ℓ-dimensional vector v = (x1, . . . , xℓ) over a domain D
consists of i-th shares of its components and is denoted by
JvKi := (Jx1Ki, . . . , JxℓKi). Analogously, an i-th share of a
matrix is defined in the same way. Therefore, a secret sharing
scheme over vectors, matrices, and tensors, among others, can
be defined.
2) Secure Computation based on Secret Sharing.: We de-
fine sub protocols of secure computation that we utilized in
our work. The following computations are defined over a
residue class ring ZM = {0, . . . ,M − 1} modulo integer M .
Several efficient implementations of the protocols have been
provided [24], [27].
• JcK ← ADD(JaK, JbK): ADD takes shares JaK and JbK of
a ∈ ZM and b ∈ ZM , respectively, as inputs, then outputs
a share JcK of a+ b = c ∈ ZM .
• JcK ← ADDConst(JaK, b): ADDConst takes share JaK of
a ∈ ZM and b ∈ ZM as inputs, then outputs a share JcK
of a+ b = c ∈ ZM .
• JcK ← MUL(JaK, JbK): MUL takes shares JaK and JbK of
a ∈ ZM and b ∈ ZM , respectively, as inputs, then outputs
a share JcK of a× b = c ∈ ZM .
• JcK ← MULConst(JaK, b): MULConst takes share JaK of
a ∈ ZM and b ∈ ZM as inputs, then outputs a share JcK
of a× b = c ∈ ZM .
• JcK ← CMP(JaK, JbK): CMP takes shares JaK and JbK of
a ∈ ZM and b ∈ ZM , respectively, as inputs, then outputs
a share J1K if a < b over the integers, J0K otherwise.
• JcK ← Half(JaK): Half takes a share JaK of a ∈ ZM as
input, then outputs a share J1K if a ≤ ⌊M/2⌋ over the
integers, J0K otherwise.
In our implementation, we utilize the ABY library [24],
which is based on a two-party setting (See Section VI-A for
details), and supports secure computation over a residue class
ring modulo integer M = 2m (m = 8, 16, 32, or 64). Here,
Half can be instantiated by the use of CMP although it is not
originally included in the ABY library.
C. Security and Network Settings
In this paper, we focus on the semi-honest adversary. More
precisely, we consider the adversary who follows protocols but
curiously learn client’s or trainer’s data. As mentioned above,
in our proposed protocol, there are three parties: the client,
the service provider, and the trainer, and note that there are n
servers in the cloud hosted by the service provider.
The trainer locally trains with plaintexts, i.e., non-encrypted
training, and constructs a model of a BNN. Then the trainer
computes shares of the model with respect to an underlying
t-out-of-n secure computation scheme, and then uploads the
resulting shares to the servers. Namely, the adversary cannot
learn the model as long as the adversary corrupts less than t
servers.
The client computes shares of its query of the prediction on
trainer’s model with respect to the underlying t-out-of-n secure
computation scheme, and then sends the resulting shares to the
cloud. More than t− 1 servers jointly compute a protocol of
the prediction with input the shares of model and the shares of
query, and then output its result. Namely, the adversary cannot
learn client’s query as long as the adversary corrupts less than
t servers.
However, similar to previous proposals [5], [15], we do not
aim to hide the size of client’s query, the network architecture
of trainer’s model, and which secure computation protocols
are used. The authors of MiniONN [5] suggested that such
information can be protected by adding dummy layers, which
can also be integrated with our proposed protocol.
Finally, we assume the use of secure channel, which can be
instantiated by the transport layer security (TLS) [28]. This
setting is the same as that in other literature [5], [15].
III. OUR MAIN IDEA
1) Technical Problem: This work aims to create a system
that achieves both the performance and the security of a trained
model by using BNNs. The values in the operations of BNNs
are binarized into +1 or −1 and may seem to be compatible
with the algebraic structures of secure computation. However,
the processes of the original batch normalization [23] that
improve the performance of neural networks are linear opera-
tions in real numbers, making them incompatible with secure
computation in integers.
2) Transformation into Integers: To solve the compatibility
problem, we transform the parameters of batch normalization
into linear operations in integers by truncating lower digits of
the parameters and then multiplying them by a constant. We
heuristically know that such transformation has small influence
on the accuracy because errors can be reset by using non-
linear processing in an activation function after the batch
normalization. In particular, the possibility that the truncation
of digits changes the sign of the output of batch normalization
(i.e., from positive to negative and vice versa) and influence
the activation function is negligible. The output of the batch
normalization in the output layer is identical to that of BNNs,
and the maximized value in these output vectors can be finally
obtained as a prediction result. The possibility that the index
of a maximized value is changed is negligible, and thus the
truncation of digits does not affect the prediction result. In
actual applications, the sizes of the parameters can be chosen
such that the decline in the accuracy in a trained BNN model
is minimal.
The method described above solves the incompatibility
problem between the algebraic structures of the operations
of BNNs and secure computation. Moreover, this method
achieves a higher accuracy than the bit-shift method in the
original BNNs [21] because the standard batch normalization
can clip distribution with a higher accuracy. Finally, we can
construct MOBIUS by combining an efficient and scalable
secure computation based on secret sharing and the improved
BNNs.
IV. BINARIZED NEURAL NETWORKS COMPATIBLE WITH
SECURE COMPUTATION
In this section, we propose improved BNNs to be used
in MOBIUS. First, we discuss the difference between the
proposed BNNs and the original BNNs [21]. Then, we de-
scribe the algorithms used in the proposed BNNs. Finally,
we instantiate an architecture for MNIST, a large database
of handwritten digits, as a concrete example of the proposed
BNNs.
A. Avoiding Shift-Based Batch Normalization
As described in the previous section, our batch normal-
ization uses only integers. Let γ(i), β(i), µ(i), and σ(i) be
learned parameters and ǫ a small positive value. The result
of ordinary batch normalization can be obtained with the
following equation:
xˆ(i) = γ(i)
x(i) − µ(i)√
σ2(i) + ǫ
+ β(i). (1)
By replacing coefficients, Equation (1) can be transformed as
xˆ(i) = s(i)x(i) + t(i) where
s(i) =
γ(i)√
σ2(i) + ǫ
, t(i) = β(i) −
γ(i)µ(i)√
σ2(i) + ǫ
. (2)
By substituting s′(i), t
′
(i) for integers s(i), t(i) using an ap-
propriate integer q, called scale parameter, we obtain an
alternative integer xˆ′(i) for xˆ(i) as follows:
xˆ′(i) = s
′
(i)x(i) + t
′
(i)
(
s′(i) = ⌊qs(i)⌋, t
′
(i) = ⌊qt(i)⌋
)
(3)
Although the value of q can be determined layerwise or
even nodewise, the same q is used in every node for brevity
in this paper. As the value q increases, the deterioration of
BNN prediction accuracy decreases. However, the increase
in q causes the increase of a bit length of a modulo M .
However, the value of the bit length of moduloM increases as
q increases, consequently increasing memory requirements and
calculation costs. Therefore, q should be as small as possible
to maintain high prediction accuracy.
B. Improved Binarized Neural Networks
In this section, we describe the binary full connection, batch
normalization, and activation algorithms used in the proposed
BNNs. The binary full connection algorithm is shown in
Algorithm 1. This algorithm takes an integer vector a and
a learned weight matrix W as inputs, then outputs the result
of matrix multiplication Wa.
Algorithm 1 BinaryFullConnection
Input: a ∈ Zdin×1 : input vector
W ∈ {−1, 1}dout×din : weight matrix
Output: c ∈ Zdout×1
Procedure:
1: c←Wa
The batch normalization algorithm is shown in Algorithm 2.
This algorithm takes an integer vector c, which is usually
an output of binary full connection, and batch normalization
parameters s′, t′ as inputs, then outputs the result of batch nor-
malization. Batch normalization parameters s′, t′ are obtained
as described in IV-A.
Algorithm 2 BatchNormalization
Input: c ∈ Zd : input vector
s′, t′ ∈ Zd: batch normalization parameters
Output: b ∈ Zd
Procedure:
1: for i = 1 to d, b(i) ← s
′
(i) ∗ c(i) + t
′
(i)
The activation algorithm is shown in Algorithm 3. This
algorithm takes an integer vector b as input, then outputs a
binary vector that represents the signs of each element of the
input vector b.
Algorithm 3 Activation
Input: b ∈ Zd: input vector
Output: a ∈ {−1, 1}d
Procedure:
1: for i = 1 to d, a(i) ←
{
−1 (b(i) < 0)
1 (b(i) ≥ 0)
C. Binarized Neural Networks for MNIST dataset
In Section IV-B, we described the algorithms used in the
proposed BNNs. To use BNNs for learning or predicting data,
we need to instantiate a concrete architecture and determine
the entire procedure. We instantiate an architecture for MNIST
dataset image classification (See Section VI-B for details on
the MNIST dataset).
Consider a typical architecture with an input layer of size
784, two hidden layers of size d, and an output layer of size 10,
Fig. 2. Architecture of the BNNs for MNIST dataset
as shown in Figure 2. In the hidden layers, the full connection,
batch normalization, and activation algorithms are executed in
order. In the output layer, only the full connection and batch
normalization algorithms are executed. In this architecture,
even though the maximum value index of the output vector
is the result of the prediction, we omit this process because
the proposed method is designed to return output vectors as
the result of secure computation.
Algorithm 4 Binarized Neural Network for MNIST
Input: input ∈ Z784×1 : input vector
W1 ∈ {−1, 1}
d×784 , s′1 ∈ Z
d×1, t′1 ∈ Z
d×1,
W2 ∈ {−1, 1}
d×d, s′2 ∈ Z
d×1, t′2 ∈ Z
d×1,
W3 ∈ {−1, 1}
10×d, s′3 ∈ Z
10×1, t′3 ∈ Z
10×1
Output: output ∈ Z10×1 : output vector
Procedure:
1: c1 ← FullConnection (input,W1)
2: b1 ← BatchNormalization (c1, s
′
1, t
′
1)
3: a1 ← Activation (b1)
4: c2 ← FullConnection (a1,W2)
5: b2 ← BatchNormalization (c2, s
′
2, t
′
2)
6: a2 ← Activation (b2)
7: c3 ← FullConnection (a2,W3)
8: output← BatchNormalization (c3, s
′
3, t
′
3)
The weight matrices W1,W2, and W3 used in algorithm 4
are learned parameters, and the batch normalization parameters
s
′
j , t
′
j can be calculated as described in Section IV-A. In
the case of d = 128, 1000 (d is the size of hidden layers),
we confirm experimentally that the deterioration of prediction
accuracy towards test data is negligible when a scale parameter
q = 10, 000. Therefore, we use q = 10, 000 in all experiments
in this work.
V. MOBIUS DESIGN
In this section, we describe the design of MOBIUS. We
first describe share generation of a trained model in the pre-
processing phase, and then show its main algorithms.
MOBIUS is composed of protocols we call secure full
connection, secure batch normalization, and secure activation.
The main sequences of these protocols are almost the same as
those described in the previous section, but we utilize secure
computation in the internal processes.
A. Secret Sharing a Model
We first construct shares of parameters, which are learned in
plaintexts, except for that of batch normalization by utilizing
secret sharing described in Section II-B. In this construction,
let M be a modulo of the secret sharing. Moreover, for any
a, JaK is a secret share if a > 0 and JM + aK is a secret
share if a < 0. Hereinafter, we denote 0 ≤ a ≤ ⌊M2 ⌋ as a
non-negative integer and ⌊M2 ⌋ < a < M as a negative integer.
Learned weight matrices Wi (i = 1, · · · ;L − 1) are
shared using secret sharing and are stored in each server in
a distributed manner. Parameters of the batch normalization
are computed using the computation in Section IV-A, and its
resulting parameters si, ti (i = 1, · · · , L − 1) are stored in
each sever as shares by utilizing the secret sharing. Finally,
the size information (L, n0, · · · , nL) of the shares themselves
are not shared, i.e., they are stored as plaintexts.
B. Model-Oblivious Prediction
The construction of a prediction protocol for MNIST in
MOBIUS is shown in Algorithm 5. The secure full connection,
secure batch normalization, and secure activation are denoted
by SecureFC, SecureBN, and SecureAct, respectively. More-
over, for any matrix X , Xi,j indicates an element of the i-th
row and j-th column and Xi indicates an element of the i-th
column.
Algorithm 5 SecureBinaryNN for MNIST
Input: JinputK ∈ Z784M : Shares of Input Vectors
Output: JoutputK ∈ Z10M : Prediction Results
Procedure:
1: Jc1K← SecureFC (JinputK , JW1K)
2: Jb1K← SecureBN (Jc1K , Js1K , Jt1K)
3: Ja1K← SecureAct (Jb1K)
4: Jc2K← SecureFC (Ja1K , JW2K)
5: Jb2K← SecureBN (Jc2K , Js2K , Jt2K)
6: Ja2K← SecureAct (Jb2K)
7: Jc3K← SecureFC (Ja2K , JW3K)
8: JoutputK← SecureBN (Jc3K , Js3K , Jt3K)
The secure full connection protocol is described in Algo-
rithm 6. The matrix multiplication between shares is computed
similarly as in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 6 SecureFullConnection
Input: JinputK ∈ ZdinM : Shares of Input Vectors
JW K ∈ Zdout×dinM : Shares of Weight Matrices
Output: JoutputK ∈ ZdoutM
Procedure:
1: for i = 0 to dout do
2: for j = 0 to din do
3: JXiK← MUL(JWi,jK, JinputjK)
4: JoutputiK← ADD(JoutputiK, JXiK)
5: end for
6: end for
The secure batch normalization protocol is described in
Algorithm 7. Although the original batch normalization [23]
requires computations of root or division, the secure batch nor-
malization protocol can be performed with only addition and
multiplication by performing the computation in Equation (2)
in advance.
Algorithm 7 SecureBatchNormalization
Input: JcK ∈ ZdM : Shares of Input Vectors
JsK , JtK ∈ ZdM : Batch Normalization Parameters
Output: JoutputK ∈ ZdM
Procedure:
1: for j = 0 to d do
2: JXjK← MUL(JcjK, JsjK)
3: JoutputiK← ADD(JXjK, JtjK)
4: end for
Fig. 3. Flow of Implementation of MOBIUS
The secure activation protocol is described in Algorithm 8.
This algorithm outputs +1 if the input is greater than or
equal to zero or −1 otherwise. As described above, a non-
negative integer is represented by {0, . . . , ⌊M2 ⌋} and a negative
integer is represented by {⌊M2 ⌋ + 1, . . . ,M − 1}. Therefore,
the algorithm is performed by a comparison operation with
⌊M2 ⌋+ 1 in secure computation.
Algorithm 8 SecureActivation
Input: JbK ∈ ZdM : Shares of Input Vectors
Output: JaK ∈ ZdM
1: for j = 0 to d do
2: JXjK← Half(JbjK)
3: JYjK← MULConst(JXjK, 2)
4: JajK← ADDConst(JYjK,−1)
5: end for
VI. EXPERIMENT
In this section, we describe the implementation of MOBIUS
and the results of experiments using the MNIST dataset.
A. Implementation
1) Language and Library: MOBIUS is implemented in
C++ with the ABY library [24] for secure computation. The
ABY library is a secure computation framework with two-
party setting, and contains three types of shares, namely,
Arithmetic, Boolean, and Yao. These shares have different
operations, and the ABY library provides efficient conversions
between them. We refer the readers to the paper [24] for details
on the ABY framework.
We briefly describe several parts related to our implementa-
tion below. The arithmetic shares can be used in arithmetic
operations, such as addition and multiplication. Therefore,
the secure full connection and secure batch normalization are
Fig. 4. Prediction Accuracy of MOBIUS
Fig. 5. Computational Time of MOBIUS
implemented with arithmetic shares. In terms of share size,
the ABY library includes four parameters as a modulo p,
i.e., 8, 16, 32, and 64 bits. Although we omit the detail due
the space limitation, the MNIST dataset is available with 32-
bit parameter. The secure activation requires a comparison
operation of secure computation, which can be computed
with Boolean or Yao shares. In the ABY library, Arithmetic
shares cannot be directly converted into Boolean shares, i.e.,
the Arithmetic shares are first converted to Yao shares and
then from Yao shares to Boolean shares. Therefore, since the
conversion of Arithmetic shares to Boolean shares requires
two conversions, we used Yao shares in the secure activation.
Besides, according to the benchmark of the ABY library [24],
a comparison operation using Yao shares can be computed
faster than using Boolean shares. We hence implement the
secure activation with Yao shares.
2) Overview of Implementation: We show the implemen-
tation flow of shares in Figure 3. In the ABY library, Yao
shares cannot be converted directly into Arithmetic shares, and
thus Yao shares need to be converted to Boolean shares first,
and then from Boolean shares to Arithmetic shares. We note
that even though Boolean shares can be used in the secure
activation, the flow shown in Figure 3 provides the fastest
implementation. In the algorithms of the original BNNs [21],
secure activation should be performed with Boolean shares
because of the bit-shift operations. The extra conversion to
Boolean shares and the overhead operations of Boolean shares
may downgrade the computational performance.
The implementation of MOBIUS was created by simply
Model Obliviousness Accuracy [%] Time [sec]
SecureML [15] X 93.1 4.88
MiniONN [5] 97.6 1.04
TAPAS [14] 97.3 147
FHE-DiNN [12] 96.3 1.64
MOBIUS X 95.9 0.76
TABLE I
PERFORMANCE OF MOBIUS WITH MNIST DATASET IN COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS.
The second column refers to the capability to make a model oblivious. The third column refers to the evaluation of the model as output at the prediction
phase. The final column refers to total elapsed time of execution in the real time, i.e., including both off-line computation and on-line computation.
Although several source codes of the other systems were obtained, we could not execute them and the values in the Table were obtained from their papers.
using the available ABY library and is therefore not optimized
unlike SecureML [15]. Therefore, the performance of the
following experiments can be improved by optimizing imple-
mentation. We plan to publish our source codes for subsequent
works. The training phase is out of the scope of this work, and
therefore a model is trained in advance. Shares of the model
and input from a client are generated by the PutSIMDINGate
function of the ABY library.
B. Experimental Setting
1) Machine Environments: We conducted experiments with
the MNIST dataset using the algorithms described in Sec-
tion IV-C on two AmazonEC2 c4.8xlarge machines, both of
which are running Linux and have 60 GB of RAM. The two
machines are hosted in the same region as a LAN setting.
The bandwidth is 1 GB/s, and the neural network has two
hidden layers with 128 neurons in each layer. This setting
is identical to that of SecureML [15]. We also utilize the
sign function as the activation function. The neural network
is fully connected. We them compare the performance of our
protocol with SecureML and other state-of-the-art protocols
with cryptography [5], [12], [14].
2) Dataset: The MNIST dataset contains 70,000 images
of handwritten digits from 0 to 9. In particular, the MNIST
dataset has 60,000 training samples and 10,000 test samples,
each with 784 features representing 28×28 pixels in the image.
Each feature is a grayscale between 0–255.
C. Results
The experimental results are shown in Table I, Figure 4, and
Figure 5. Table I shows a comparison of different protocols
based on capability to make a model oblivious, accuracy, and
computational time. Figure 4 shows a comparison of MOBIUS
and the original BNNs based on prediction accuracy with
respect to the number of neurons. Figure 5 shows a comparison
of MOBIUS and the original BNNs based on computational
time for prediction with respect to the number of neurons.
As shown in Table I, MOBIUS is the fastest system that
combines BNNs and secure computation based on secret
sharing despite having the capability to encrypt a model.
We again note that the accuracy of MOBIUS may even be
improved by optimizing our implementation. As shown in
Figure 4, MOBIUS has better prediction accuracy than the
original BNNs because it uses improved BNNs that does
not use bit-shift operations. Finally, as shown in Figure 5,
the computational time of MOBIUS seems to be linear with
respect to the number of neurons, although the computational
time becomes 100 times longer than the original BNNs. We
can thus approximately measure performance for any number
of neurons.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we presented MOBIUS (Model-Oblivious
BInarized neUral networkS), a system that enables scalable
encrypted prediction and encryption of a trained model. As
our main technical contribution, we presented new algorithms
of BNNs that are compatible with secure computation by
representing all parameters in integers and removing the bit-
shift method used in the original BNNs [21]. We then designed
the main construction of MOBIUS with secure computation
based on Arithmetic shares and Yao shares. We also conducted
experiments using the MNIST dataset, and the results show
that MOBIUS achieves higher computational performance and
higher accuracy than SecureML, which is the only other
system that considers the model-oblivious problem. As future
work, we plan to conduct experiments on more complicated
datasets, such as CIFAR10.
REFERENCES
[1] T. Ristenpart, “Confidentiality and pri-
vacy threats in machine learning,” 2017,
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Ristenpart.pdf.
[2] M. Barni, C. Orlandi, and A. Piva, “A privacy-preserving protocol for
neural-network-based computation,” in Proc. of MM&Sec 2006. ACM,
2006, pp. 146–151.
[3] C. Orlandi, A. Piva, and M. Barni, “Oblivious neural network comput-
ing via homomorphic encryption,” EURASIP Journal on Information
Security, vol. 2007, no. 1, 2007.
[4] R. Bost, R. A. Popa, S. Tu, and S. Goldwasser, “Machine learning
classification over encrypted data,” in Proc. of NDSS 2015. Internet
Society, 2015.
[5] J. Liu, M. Juuti, Y. Lu, and N. Asokan, “Oblivious neural network
predictions via minionn transformations,” in Proc. of CCS 2017. ACM,
2017, pp. 619–631.
[6] B. D. Rouhani, M. S. Riazi, and F. Koushanfar, “Deepse-
cure: Scalable provably-secure deep learning,” 2017, arXiv preprint,
https://arxiv.org/abs/1705.08963.
[7] N. Chandran, D. Gupta, A. Rastogi, R. Sharma, and S. Tri-
pathi, “Ezpc: Programmable, efficient, and scalable secure two-party
computation for machine learning,” 2017, iACR ePrint Archive,
https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/1109.
[8] M. S. Riazi, C. Weinert, O. Tkachenko, E. M. Songhori, T. Schneider,
and F. Koushanfar, “Chameleon: A hybrid secure computation frame-
work for machine learning applications,” in Proc. of ASIACCS 2018.
ACM, 2018, pp. 707–721.
[9] C. Juvekar, V. Vaikuntanathan, and A. Chandrakasan, “Gazelle: A low la-
tency framework for secure neural network inference,” in Proc. of Usenix
Security 2018, 2018, arXive preprint, https://arxiv.org/abs/1801.05507.
[10] N. Dowlin, R. Gilad-Bachrach, N. Dowlin, K. Laine, K. Lauter,
M. Naehrig, and J. Wernsing, “Cryptonets: Applying neural networks
to encrypted data with high throughput and accuracy,” in Proc. of ICML
2016, 2016, pp. 201–210.
[11] M. Chase, R. Gilad-Bachrach, K. Laine, K. Lauter, and P. Rindal,
“Private collaborative neural network learning,” 2017, iACR ePrint
Archive, https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/762.
[12] F. Bourse, M. Minelli, M. Minihold, and P. Paillier, “Fast homomorphic
evaluation of deep discretized neural networks,” 2017, iACR ePrint
Archive, https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/1114.
[13] S. Wagh, D. Gupta, and N. Chandran, “Securenn: Efficient and
private neural network training,” 2018, iACR ePrint Archive,
https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/442.
[14] A. Sanyal, M. Kusner, A. Gascon, and V. Kanade, “Tapas: Tricks to
accelerate (encrypted) prediction as a service,” in Proc. of ICML 2018,
2018. [Online]. Available: https://arxiv.org/abs/1806.03461
[15] P. Mohassel and Y. Zhang, “Secureml: A system for scalable privacy-
preserving machine learning,” in Proc. of IEEE S&P. IEEE, 2017, pp.
19–38.
[16] C. Dwork, “Proc. of icalp 2006,” in Differential Privacy, ser. LNCS,
vol. 4052. Springer, 2006, pp. 1–12.
[17] M. Abadi, A. Chu, I. Goodfellow, H. B. McMahan, I. Mironov, K. Tal-
war, and L. Zhang, “Deep learning with differential privacy,” in Proc.
of CCS 2016. ACM, 2016, pp. 308–318.
[18] J. C. Duchi, M. I. Jordan, and M. J. Wainwright, “Local privacy and
statistical minimax rates,” in Proc. of FOCS 2013. IEEE, 2013, pp.
429–438.
[19] B. Ding, H. Nori, P. Li, and J. Allen, “Comparing population means
under local differential privacy: with significance and power,” in Proc.
of AAAI 2018. AAAI, 2018, pp. 26–33.
[20] F. Alda` and B. I. Rubinstein, “The bernstein mechanism: Function
release under differential privacy,” in Proc. of AAAI 2017. AAAI,
2017, pp. 1705–1711.
[21] M. Courbariaux, I. Hubara, D. Soudry, R. El-Yaniv, and
Y. Bengio, “Binarized neural networks: Training deep neural networks
with weights and activations constrained to +1 or -1,” 2016,
arXiv preprint, https://arxiv.org/abs/1602.02830. [Online]. Available:
https://arxiv.org/abs/1602.02830
[22] C. Gentry, “Fully homomorphic encryption using ideal lattice,” in Proc.
of STOC 2009. ACM, 2009, pp. 169–178.
[23] S. Ioffe and C. Szegedy, “Batch normalization: Accelerating deep
network training by reducing internal covariate shift,” in Proc. of IML
2015. JMLR.org, 2015, pp. 448–456.
[24] D. Demmler, T. Schneider, and M. Zohner, “Aby - a framework for
efficient mixed-protocol secure two-party computation,” in Proc. of
NDSS 2015. Internet Society, 2015.
[25] S. Halevi and V. Shoup, “Bootstrapping for helib,” in Proc. of EURO-
CRYPT 2015, ser. LNCS, vol. 9056. Springer, 2015, pp. 641–670.
[26] A. Shamir, “How to share a secret,” Communication of the ACM, vol. 22,
no. 11, pp. 612–613, 1979.
[27] D. Bogdanov, S. Laur, and J. Willemson, “Sharemind: A framework for
fast privacy-preserving computations,” in Proc. of ESORICS 2008, ser.
LNCS, vol. 5283. Springer, 2008, pp. 192–206.
[28] E. Rescorla and T. Dierks, “The Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Protocol Version 1.2,” RFC 5246, 2008. [Online]. Available:
https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5246.txt
